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M

of what was a large, industrious Iraqi family. His family, his parents, and his
two siblings’ families resided in one complex, located
in Nassiriyia, Iraq. On March 23, 2003 tragedy struck. After
U.S. fighter planes targeted an area nearby, and an errant missile landed on the family complex. The only survivors were Mr.
Jawad and his teenaged niece Zainab, who was left with severe
burns covering over forty percent of her body. Thirteen family
members died. The United States paid Mr. Jawad and Zainab
$5,000 for their losses and suffering.
On June 17, 2003, several children were playing in a clearing in the Al-Shula neighborhood of Baghdad. A few weeks
earlier, unexploded cluster bombs from U.S. artillery landed in
the clearing. Unaware of its deadly impact, the neighborhood
children unwittingly picked up the ordinance, and it detonated.
The explosion injured four children and killed Mr. Mahmoud’s
three-year-old daughter. The United States did not compensate
Mr. Mahmoud.
On June 18, 2003, Mr. Mohammed, a former Iraqi Army
soldier, and nearly one hundred of his comrades, demonstrated
at the North Gate entrance to the Green Zone in Baghdad, protesting the dissolution of the Iraqi Army. U.S. soldiers blocked
the crowd’s ingress to the Green Zone. Protestors threw rocks,
but the U.S. soldiers made no violent gestures because the rocks
posed no imminent danger. A Military Police convoy of three
HMMWVs (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or
Humvee) slowly moved through the crowd. The soldier manning the high-powered machine gun in the last HMMWV fired
two shots into the crowd. One bullet hit Mr. Mohammed. The
soldier later claimed he returned fire in the direction where
shots emanated. An investigation later concluded that it was
more probable that gunshots were not fired from the crowd. Mr.
Mohammed later died from his wound. The United States paid
his widow $2,500 for her loss.
Mr. Abbas was driving in his white van on June 29, 2003 on
Haifa Street in Baghdad. As he passed through the Hamm ad
Shihab traffic circle, a rocket-propelled grenade was fired from
a green BMW at nearby U.S. soldiers. None of the soldiers were
injured, and they quickly returned fire. The green BMW sped
away. Two bullets errantly hit Mr. Abbas. He died at a hospital
several days later from his wounds. The United States paid his
widow $2,500 for her loss.
In early 2004 the survivors in each of these cases filed compensation claims with the author of this article at the Baghdad
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Devising a new system for compensating innocent Iraqi civilian casualties is imperative.

Convention Center. The U.S. military responded by issuing
judgments in the form of “condolence payments.”
U.S. military and civilian leadership take tremendous pride
in the accuracy of their weaponry and the exceptional training of
their military personnel. Nevertheless, innocent casualties are an
unfortunate reality of warfare. While the practice of firebombing
cities seems behind us, on two occasions U.S. forces lead extensive attacks that combined artillery fire, air strikes, and ground
attacks on Falluja, a town west of Baghdad with a population of
300,000. Civilian casualties mount daily in Iraq even without
“major battles.” Despite the mounting death toll, no mechanism
legally obligates the United States (or any military power) to
compensate victims of lawful armed conflict. In Iraq, the United
States sometimes provides nominal amounts of compensation to
victims’ families, but this article argues that offering full compensation is imperative.
Most discussions about armed conflict treat civilian casualties as a tragic but unavoidable result that should be minimized
to the extent possible. This discussion must be expanded. In
wars of choice or intervention, military powers must be legally
obligated to compensate victims’ families in an adequate,
timely, and just manner.

Responsibility to Compensate
Today no norm or obligation exists within international
human rights or international humanitarian law requiring a government to compensate foreign nationals innocently harmed.
However, an emerging norm requiring compensation or reparation exists if the harm results from a war crime or crime
against humanity.2 In this vein, the U.S. military can make
compensation payments under the Foreign Claims Act3 (FCA)
when U.S. soldiers unlawfully harm innocent civilians. The
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FCA creates a system intended to provide full monetary compensation to victims of unlawful acts — such as the incident in
Mahmudiyah where four U.S. soldiers raped a young girl and
murdered her and her family.4 Unfortunately, the military has
grossly underutilized the FCA and has not used the statute in
many of the most egregious murder and assault cases in Iraq
and Afghanistan, including the incident in Mahmudiyah. The
FCA allows civil society to articulate concerns when the United
States fails to compensate victims of unlawful acts. However,
there are no laws requiring the military to compensate civilians
harmed during lawful military operations.
The term “civilian” is defined here as a person not armed,
formally associated with the groups in conflict, or taking direct
part in the conflict. In Iraq, it is impossible to determine the
number of civilian casualties harmed by U.S. personnel versus
those harmed by various insurgent groups. Certainly, U.S. combat-related actions have harmed thousands of civilians, whether
through targeted air strikes, civilians caught in the crossfire,
or civilians killed through the escalation of force when U.S.
soldiers misperceive a threat. This situation results in moral and
practical imperatives necessitating compensation.
When a nation chooses to enter war, whether justifying it
under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect or some other
authority, it takes on the responsibility to fight a “just war.”
While many just war discussions focus on jus ad bellum — the
justness of entering a war — and jus en bello — fighting a war in
a just manner — few emphasize jus post bellum — justice after
war. When ethicists discuss jus post bellum, they are concerned
with the rightness of the conclusion of war. A just conclusion
exists when: (1) a more secure and just state of affairs than
existed prior to the war is established; and (2) the protection of
an individual’s human rights is more secure.5 Practitioners and
scholars concerned with jus post bellum are mainly concerned
with reparation, trials for war crimes and crimes against humanity and reconstruction efforts to rebuild infrastructure and the rule
of law.6 The right of innocently harmed civilians to compensation must be added. Civilians’ rights remain insecure if no legal
mechanism exists for them to receive compensation. Instead of
increasing security, war has destroyed their lives, killed their
loved ones, and diminished their prospects for a stable future.
There is no justice if “armies of right” bulldoze over civilians
and leave them to decay in the mire of war’s aftermath. Offering
surviving family members payment recognizes victims’ dignity
and helps alleviate families’ immediate needs.
Along with moral reasons, practical considerations
also play a key role. The new U.S. Army Field Manual on
Counterinsurgency greatly stresses the importance of winning
civilians’ hearts and minds.7 To win hearts and minds, militaries
must take a holistic approach to rebuilding a nation after war
by providing infrastructure, governance, safety and well-being.
Failure in these components may prevent lasting victory. When
people lose faith in the occupying army or a new government,
they may seek insurgent forces for shelter or assistance. If
militaries abuse the civilian population, whether by cordoning
off entire blocks and arresting all fighting aged men, destroying property while raiding houses, frightening children during
searches, embarrassing honor-bound men, or unintentionally
killing and harming civilians, they will send the population into
the enemy’s waiting arms. Thus, positive treatment of civilians becomes imperative to strategic military interests. While

building a school or hospital may help the military “win over” a
community, providing individual monetary assistance to a family who lost a breadwinner during a firefight can “win over” a
family and a neighborhood.
These moral and practical considerations necessitate that
governments and policy-makers ensure militaries can provide
full compensation to innocent civilians harmed as a result of
armed conflict. The normative legal framework of humanitarian
law should include equitable and adequate combat claims.

The Inadequacy of Condolence Payments in Iraq
Although U.S. law does not formally recognize a right to file
combat claims, U.S. military attorneys and commanders have
stated that paying combat claims is essential to the military’s
interests in repeated engagements since the Vietnam War. After
an incident involving the deaths of many Vietnamese in the city
of Nha Trang, Judge Advocates at U.S. military headquarters in
Vietnam convinced ground commanders that paying claimants
would “gain the goodwill of the people,”8 and that an “effective

“An equitable combat
claims system helps ensure
that victims will not only
view the alien army as the
harbinger of pain and suffering, but as a force that
fairly and justly compensates those they harm.”
claims program supported the war against the guerrillas.”9 While
the military used contingency funds in this particular case, Judge
Advocates recommended that U.S. law be amended to authorize
combat related claims.10 Military lawyers continue to realize that
offering combat claims is important. In its after-action review
of the first year of combat missions after September 11, 2001,
the U.S. Army’s Center for Law and Military Operations wrote,
“[C]ommanders believed that the payment of legitimate claims
helped win the hearts and minds of the populace and enhanced
their units’ force protection postures.”11
Instead of creating an equitable law, in every major conflict
since Vietnam, the United States has implemented ad hoc nominal payment programs. Iraq is no different. The only form of
combat claims that U.S. military regulations allow are termed
solatia payments. These are nominal amounts payable from a
commander’s operation and maintenance funds as an expression
of sympathy. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) — the command responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan — did not authorize
17
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the course of a non-combat related accident, but may only pay
$2,500 for the death of a civilian killed in a firefight. A $2,500
payment provides little help to widows, like Mr. Mohammed’s
wife, with several young mouths to feed. This artificial limit
leaves survivors bitter and frustrated with the United States.
Second, reconstruction projects overshadow condolence payments. Commanders prioritize CERP funds for reconstruction
projects at hospitals, schools, or power stations, at the expense
of condolence payments. In fiscal year 2005 condolence payments accounted for eight percent of all CERP disbursements;
in fiscal year 2006 it decreased to five percent. The perception
in this author’s unit was that fixing a school and employing Iraqi
contractors allowed funds to go further than paying a widow
for losing her husband. And when the same fund supports both
projects, the one of lesser importance gets short-changed. Mr.
Mahmoud did not receive compensation after his daughter died
from a cluster munition because funds for condolence payments
were unavailable when he visited the convention center.
Third, the rules governing condolence payments are ad hoc.
Each unit takes different approaches to if, when, and how to
make condolence payments. Some units choose to pay only high
profile cases. Others will not pay claims when a different unit
caused the harm no matter how difficult or impossible it will
be for an Iraqi to file with the “appropriate” unit. In Ramadi
military officials told local Iraqis that they could not file claims
when the incident occurred over three months before.13 This
does not afford the victim or survivor time to collect evidence
or documents; nor does it allow for time to grieve before filing a claim. A final problem resulting from the program’s ad
hoc nature is that no adequate claims officers’ guidelines exist.
Different victims receive disparate treatment because officers
lack substantive guidance regarding standard of proof, rules of
evidence, how to determine valuation, or sensitivity training.
Unit lawyers will not operate effectively or uniformly without
concrete guidance. The nature of this system leads to drastically
different results for civilians who suffer the same harm. These
conflicting outcomes intensify negativity and nullify any potential goodwill won by offering condolence payments.
The sum of these problems creates a program where hearts
and minds are not won and victims are not offered redress.
With firsthand experience meeting over 1,000 Iraqis, this author
knows well that the current system is not meeting its goals.

Widows of Iraqi civilians accidentally killed during the current conflict
typically only receive $2,500.

solatia payments at the start of operation Iraqi Freedom, reasoning that issuing solatia payments contravened local customs. The
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently issued
a report citing some Marine units that briefly used solatia in Iraq,
however.12 Without solatia, the military lacked mechanisms to
provide monetary assistance to innocent civilians harmed from
March 19, 2003 until the following September when the military
established the current ad hoc program. The highest level of
command in Iraq authorized “condolence payments” to be dispersed from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP) fund. Commanders may use CERP funds to assist the
Iraqi people by providing “condolence payments to Iraqi civilians for the death or injury resulting from U.S., coalition, and
supporting military operations.” For several reasons the program
is inequitable and inadequately meets the moral and practical
goals of a combat claims program.
First, payments for every death, injury, or property damage incident are limited to $2,500. Brigadier generals or higher
can now authorize payments of up to $10,000; however, there
is little to no evidence of any individual payments exceeding
$2,500 per death. Placing a price on personal tragedy is always
difficult, but it is possible to provide payments respectfully and
in line with regional customs. Under the FCA, officers may
pay full market value when a tank runs over an Iraqi’s truck in

Recommendations for an
Equitable Compensation System
For a combat claims system to work effectively, the U.S.
Congress should legislate a fair, just and equitable system to
compensate innocent civilian survivors and victims’ family
members. This program should possess several characteristics.
First, it is essential that the program be permanent and standalone. As long as the military creates ad hoc programs for each
military engagement, combat claims will generally fall under
a larger umbrella of reconstruction projects where the use of
claims will be minimal and overshadowed. With a separate system, funds will always be accessible when needed. Timeliness
is essential because a family’s suffering generally grows exponentially when help is delayed. Also, an institutional program
will allow the military to start the program soon after combat
commences — within days or weeks instead of six months.
Permanence would also eliminate disparate results.
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Second, military officers should make claims payments.
Allowing State Department officials or a non-governmental
organization to make payments, while attractive for other
reasons, does not achieve one of the program’s major goals.
Because the military engages in combat activity and causes
innocent civilian casualties, the military should offer victims’ families condolence for its actions through payments.
Furthermore, recognizing harm done can be as important as the
monetary payment. The recognition a family receives will mean
more coming from someone wearing the same uniform as the
person who harmed the loved one. Keeping the program within
the military also serves the purpose of documenting civilian
casualties. Without knowing an accurate number of civilian
casualties, it is difficult to evaluate claims that the United States
minimizes civilian casualties as much as possible.14
Third, the U.S. military must lift the $2,500 payment limit.
The program must contain a mechanism to allow larger payments in deserving cases. Similarly, the amount must be high
enough to demonstrate genuine condolence and provide enough
resources for the survivors to recover from the loss in the shortterm.
Fourth, a claimant must be able to appeal the initial decision when he feels the amount offered is inadequate. Similarly,
if the claim is denied outright, the claimant must be given an
opportunity to file additional materials and appeal the decision
to a higher authority. The claimant deserves to know the basis
for decisions and to have decisions in writing. Transparency is

essential in this process so that civilians understand and respect
the program.
Fifth, for the program to be successful, claims officers must
be adequately trained. The U.S. Army trains Judge Advocates in
operational law, a discipline under which claims training could
fall. Operational law training allows lawyers to provide excellent legal advice in the field. Adding combat claims training will
allow the program to run efficiently and uniformly. The training
must provide practical guidance on applicable standards of proof
and other evidentiary issues, as well as provide education on
why the program is important and why and how claims officers
must show empathy towards victims. Establishing guidelines
for this program is difficult because valuation will always be
somewhat subjective; however, it is possible to effectively train
lawyers to evaluate each case by its facts and circumstances to
find an appropriate amount.

Conclusion
War need not be totally unforgiving. When innocent people become intertwined in the consequences of armed conflict,
a chance for recognition and compassion exists. An equitable
combat claims system helps ensure that victims will not only
view the alien army as the harbinger of pain and suffering, but
as a force that fairly and justly compensates those they harm.
International humanitarian law principles and norms should be
expanded to recognize that innocent civilians deserve assistance
in order to more fully possess their rights.
HRB
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